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Abstract 
 
 
Rapid population ageing has dramatically increased the social and economic cost of elderly care. 
Demand for care labour is increasing rapidly, and all countries are experiencing problems in 
recruiting enough workers to meet demand. In some countries, the shortage of care workers has 
been met by a large inflow of immigrant, mostly female, workers. The paper’s aim is twofold. To 
argue that the way in which care is provided and financed may entail large differences in the 
creation of a formal care market. Provision in kind and ‘tied’ monetary transfers - that is, cash 
benefits that are somehow regulated – may prevent the formation of a large informal care market. 
National employment models in turn shape the features of the care labour market: in fact, they 
affect the quantity and the quality of the care labour supply, the size of the care labour shortage, and 
the degree of dependence on migrant carers. We show how these two factors combine to shape the 
characteristics of care regimes and their long term sustainability. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
Rapid population ageing has dramatically increased the social and economic cost of elderly care. 
While increasing awareness of the need for public concern is bringing about some form of public 
involvement even in the most familistic welfare states, projections of future spending on long term 
care portend a severe problem of sustainability cutting across the various care regimes. Solutions 
have been looked for in two directions: reduction of entitlements - targeting services more closely 
on the population in greatest need - and reduction of the costs of care. As a consequence of the 
search for cost effectiveness/reduction we observe a convergence in how the care market is 
organised: all countries are moving towards home care, private provision, and cash transfers. 
Demand for care labour, however, is increasing rapidly, and all countries are experiencing problems 
in recruiting enough workers to meet demand. In some countries, the shortage of care workers has 
been met by a large inflow of immigrant, mostly female, workers. The paper’s aim is twofold. To 
argue that the way in which care is provided and financed may entail large differences in the 
creation of a formal care market. Provision in kind and ‘tied’ monetary transfers - that is, cash 
benefits that are somehow regulated – may prevent the formation of a large informal care market. 
Moreover, we argue that national employment models1 in turn shape the features of the care labour 
market: in fact, they affect the quantity and the quality of the care labour supply, the size of the care 
labour shortage, and the degree of dependence on migrant carers. The last section shows how these 
two factors combine to shape the characteristics of care regimes and their long term sustainability. 
 
 
2. Care regimes and the creation of a care market 
 
The cost of care in terms of provision of goods and services is ultimately borne by society: 
entitlement to care determines the amount of resources that each society is willing to bestow on 
dependent elderly; obligation to care regulates how the cost is shared. Each country/society defines 
the minimum rights to care, and the minimum obligations of family/society, doing so either 
explicitly through  regulation, or implicitly by defining the scope of policy provision. In Southern 
Europe, families are still legally bound to take care of elderly people; in continental Europe, family 
responsibilities are regulated implicitly; in the UK and Scandinavian countries, there is no family 
obligation specified by law and there is a more explicit individual entitlement to a minimum level of 
service. 
 
Assessing the total cost of long term care for the elderly is not an easy task. Taxation, social and 
private contributions, and private funds are the sources of financing; and their proportions define 
the society’s consensus on the care regime. In most countries, private households share the burden 
of care by making substantial co-payments for care provided under public programmes. On the 
other hand, various channels of income support for elderly persons or their family carers 
supplement private expenditure: elderly care insurance payments, dependency and care allowances, 
retirement pensions. In some countries, these last still represent the most important monetary 
transfer to elderly persons and the main resource with which they pay for care. Increasingly, the 
carer is also supported by various forms of non monetary benefits, such as tax relief, social security 
contributions, rights to work leave. The fading of boundaries between health and care adds 
complexity. In most countries, the health care system provides universal coverage, which is 
financed primarily by the general budget, although co-payments may be required for most services. 
The distribution of functions between residential homes, nursing homes and hospitals has varied not 
only among countries but also among municipalities, possibly giving rise to different assessment 
criteria for similar services (Oecd 2005, p. 39). Thus home nursing care services may be partly or 
                                                 
1 See Bosch, G., Rubery, J., and Lehndorff, S. (2007) for a review of European employment models. 
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fully financed by the health care system, while social services such as home help and nursing home 
care are means-tested or not covered at all. We thus observe an increasing complexity and 
complementarity of flows, which makes it difficult to estimate the net cost borne by the family in 
the various regimes. 
 
Obligation to care and source of funding define different care regimes. Three broad classifications 
have been devised (European Commission 1999). In the Beveridge-oriented systems, services are 
funded out of general taxation and, though universally defined, they are to a large extent means-
tested or income-related. In the Bismarck-oriented systems, universal insurance schemes, unrelated 
to income or means, are intended to prevent deterioration towards social assistance. In the 
Mediterranean and Central-Eastern European countries, families are still the main source of support. 
Table 1 classifies countries according to entitlement to care and source of funding in effect at the 
turn of the century.2 Each grouping allows for a large internal variety of features: hence ability to 
pay may determine the amount and the quality of care received or the co-payments required. When 
means are assessed, the reference may be the income and/or the assets of the elderly person, the 
spouse, or the wider family; and there may be differential rights/charging structures for health care 
and personal care. On the other hand, as care regimes strive to adapt to demographic and social 
changes, common trends are emerging to change the location of some countries in the cells of Table 
1. Thus, as the Mediterranean countries seek to develop more coherent plans for the financing of 
care (see the “Lei de dependencia” in Spain, the creation of a “National fund for dependency” in 
Italy, and the Home Help programme initiated by the Greek government with Community funding), 
they move closer to the two other systems.3 
                                                 
2 Any classification implies a certain degree of over-simplification: in the case of France, for instance, social 
contributions represent less than half the resources used to finance long term care, with local or national taxes making 
up the remaining part (Lima 2006). 
3 Italy and Spain seem to move towards a system funded through taxation: in Italy the financial law 2008 allocated 400 
millions euros (over 3 years) for the dependency fund. In Greece, in the last few years the range of services has been 
expanded and supplemented with open care (the Centres for the Open Protection of the Elderly, known as KAPI) and 
home care services (the project “Assistance at home” for elderly living alone). The general goal is to get away from the 
“clinical” model and adopt the “social” model (Karamessini and Moukanou 2006). 
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Table 1.      Elderly care regimes in the EU, end 1990s 
 
Country groups Northern Europe 
Beveridge-oriented 
Continental Europe 
Bismarck-oriented 
Mediterranean 
Countries 
Newly 
accessing 
countries 
Characteristics State responsibility 
for dependency 
through social and 
health services 
funded from 
general taxation 
Dependency as a new 
form of risk, to be 
covered through a new 
form of insurance or 
universal cover 
Based on a 
principle of 
social 
assistance 
Families legally 
or implicitly 
bound to care 
Countries 
(selection)  
Sweden, UK,  
Ireland, Denmark, 
Finland 
Germany, Austria, 
 France, Luxembourg 
Greece, Italy, 
 Spain, 
Portugal 
Hungary, 
Poland, 
Bulgaria 
 
Source: European Commission (1999); National Reports. 
 
 
2.1  The organisation of the care sector 
 
Different combinations of three actors - the state, the family, and the market - give rise to important 
differences among countries as to how their care sectors are organised. These differences affect the 
amount of care that each actor is called upon to provide, as well as the organisation of care 
provision and the characteristics of the care labour market.  
 
There is still considerable cross-country variation in the role played by formal/public care, with the 
Mediterranean countries - where the bulk of care is still provided by the family - and the 
Scandinavian countries - with a greater reliance on public provision - at the two extremes. Yet the 
majority of care is still provided informally: over 80% of total hours of care are furnished by the 
family. The bulk of informal care is provided by women, with a peak of care-giving in the 45-65 
age bracket. As this same group has been targeted by the Lisbon strategy to achieve greater labour 
market participation, there may be a problem of reconciling two potentially conflicting targets. 
Men’s share is higher where elderly people are living as couples. Spouses in fact play a 
disproportionate role in elderly care. Since an increasing number of people are living alone, this will 
increase the demand for formal care. Women aged 75 and above are at the highest risk of living 
alone. Thus, women are at the forefront in both the supply and the demand for care.   
 
Countries also differ in the relative weights assumed by institutional and home care services. Table 
2 provides a comparison across countries and over time. It should be noted that the data in the table 
may reflect different classification criteria (in the case of Austria and Germany, for instance, only 
nursing homes are counted under residential care). Moreover, they do not indicate the quality of 
services: for instance, the number of hours of home care services received by elderly persons, or the 
quality of residential care. However, the table clearly shows that market services (both public and 
private) are least developed in the Mediterranean countries. 
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Table 2.  Percentage of elderly people (65+)  in residential and home care  
 
Country Residential Recipients of home care services 
 % mid-
1990s 
Year % % mid-
1990s 
year % 
       
Sweden 5.4 2005 6.0 13.0 2005 9.0 
UK 5.1 2000 5.1 13.0 2002 20.3 
France 3.0 2002 7.9 7.0 1998 7.9 
Austria 4.7 2000 3.6 3.0 2000 14.8 
Germany 5.0 2003 3.9 3.0 2003 7.1 
Spain 2.8 2004 3.7 1.0 2004 3.1 
Italy 2.0 2000 2.1 1.3 1999 3.0 
Greece 0.5 2001 0.6 … 2005 4.1 
 
Sources: For the 1990s, OECD (1996). For later data, OECD (2005, p. 41),  
   and National Reports. 
 
 
As noted, projections of future spending on long term care portend a severe problem of 
sustainability, and this has prompted a search for solutions. A reduction of entitlements, increased 
charges to recipients and cutbacks in care costs, combined in various proportions, represent a 
common recipe (OECD 2005, p. 86). Cost reduction has taken mainly two forms: a search for cost 
effectiveness, for instance by resorting to technology to save labour or to achieve the closer 
integration/coordination of social and health services, and greater reliance on cheaper forms of 
provision. In the latter case, the total amount of care labour may even increase, with savings gained 
from contracting the care out to firms, or to family members which do not ‘cost’ them, or cost them 
at a lower value. 
 
Two common trends are changing the organisation of the care sector: a shift to domiciliary care 
away from institutionalisation, and a move away from the in-kind provision of services towards 
private procurement - either through direct contracting-out to private (for-profit and non-profit) 
organisations, or through greater reliance on cash benefits.  We may thus witness convergence to a 
model consisting of public responsibility, private (market) provision, and greater family 
involvement. 
 
The shift to home care. The shift in favour of home care (both formal and informal)4 is intended to 
delay institutionalisation and to match the preferences of the elderly person. A declining trend in 
residential care is more evident in countries where it is most developed: e.g. in the Scandinavian 
countries and in France, where home care is developing faster than residential care. The trend is still 
on the rise in those countries – namely the Mediterranean countries, and especially Spain – which 
lag behind in residential care, although the upward trend may be thwarted by other, cheaper 
solutions, such as home care services provided by immigrants. 
 
                                                 
4 The traditional distinction between informal care provided by the family (spouse, daughter/son, other relative, friend) 
and formal care provided by an employee – either public or private – on a regular basis is being blurred by the 
increasing use of income support or insurance allowances to pay for family carers or to hire ‘informal’ carers in the 
market – such as paid immigrant carers. The term ‘formal care’ is used here to refer to regular employment, and 
‘informal care’ to that provided by family or irregular workers. 
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With family care already at its limits, the shift of care to the community requires greater public 
support for the dependent person and the family carers. Public policy has indeed shifted a larger 
share of resources to home care services in order to maintain disabled older people in their homes 
where possible, rather than in care institutions. This has been done in a number of ways: from 
providing more support services - such as respite and counselling, and larger supply from home-
care providers in the community - to investing in new forms of residential care and adoption of new 
technology and innovation to postpone institutionalisation. However, it is financial incentives – 
monetary transfers such as care allowances or vouchers - that have been most widely used to 
encourage family members to furnish care. Financial payments may be supplemented by other 
measures supporting the family carer, such as entitlement to pension contributions, social and 
accident insurance, tax exemption, training courses, rights to work leave, and reduction of working 
time. The situation is in continuous change; but despite still marked cross-country differences, there 
is a clear common trend towards providing some sort of carer support (table 3).5 As a result, in half 
of the countries for which data are available, home care now accounts for more than 30% of total 
public long term care expenditure (OECD 2005, figure 1.4).  
 
 
Table 3.     Public support for the informal carer 
 
Measures Countries 
 
 
• Monetary transfers  
(Financial aid) 
 
 
 
• Tax relief 
 
• Qualifying for social 
      contributions  
 
 
• Respite care 
 
 
• Training for the caregiver (or 
the privately hired minder) 
 
• Compulsory insurance 
 
• Rights to work leave  
 
 
 
 
• Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Norway, 
Hungary, Switzerland, Poland 
 
 
• Spain, France; Germany, Greece 
 
• Austria, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Switzerland 
 
 
• Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, 
Switzerland 
 
• Belgium, Germany, Italy 
 
 
• Germany 
 
• Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden 
 
Source: OECD (2005); European Commission (2007); National Reports.  
 
 
                                                 
5 The UK is still unique in giving legal recognition and associated rights and services to family carers under the Carers’ 
Equal Opportunities Act 2004. 
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The shift to private provision. The second trend is a shift to private provision occurring both in the 
form of the contracting-out of services previously provided by local authorities and in the form of a 
shift from in-kind services to in-cash allowances. In the latter case, families can then spend their 
allowances to buy services from the market. The UK has gone furthest in the outsourcing process, 
in response to an explicit shift in government policy in favour of ‘privatisation’.6 At the other 
extreme, in Sweden subcontracting arrangements have increased, but they are still a minority source 
of provision: home care services remain dominated by the public sector in terms of both financing 
and provision (Ahmed and Anxo 2006). In other countries, subcontracting by municipal authorities 
has grown rapidly: in Italy non-profit organisations (mostly social cooperatives) now provide the 
bulk of home care services (about 69% of total social workers, according to a recent estimate: Da 
Roit and Sabatinelli 2005). Private organisations can pay lower wages and operate much more 
flexibly than the public sector (for instance, by providing care in unsocial hours), thus constituting a 
cheaper source of care services (Simonazzi 2006).  
 
The common trend towards the greater role of services provided by the market has resulted in 
different divisions of the care market among public, for-profit, and non-profit organisations (table 
4).7 In Spain and Greece, in the absence of a substantial public policy, private organisations still 
perform a major (and autonomous) role: mostly religious organisations in Greece (Karamessini and 
Moukonou 2006), mostly for-profit organisations (93%) in Spain  (Miguélez, Lope and Olivares 
2006).  
 
Different types of providers coexist: individual workers and small companies active at the local 
level (France, especially in home care), non-profit organisations (Austria, France, Germany, 
Sweden) and social cooperatives (Italy, Spain), small private firms along with non-profit 
organisations run by the church (Greece); large private firms (France for residential homes, Spain); 
large non-profit organisations (France and the UK). There is a gradual trend towards a 
concentration of providers: in 2001 in France 20% of private residential homes were being run by 5 
companies, while in Spain some large integrated firms – operating throughout the country, offering 
the entire range of care services, and with the public administration as their main client – have 
developed in recent years (Miguélez, Lope and Olivares 2006). Private for-profit firms tend to 
concentrate in residential care, although a trend towards consolidation of the residential and home 
care segments can be noted in some countries, with large integrated firms offering the entire range 
of care services (Spain; social cooperatives in Italy). On the other hand, tight budget constraints 
(UK) and/or competition from cheap alternatives (immigrant carers in Italy), together with the shift 
to home care, are driving private companies active in residential care out of the market (or out of 
activities more intensive in health tasks, such as nursing homes).  
                                                 
6 According to Anxo and Fagan (2005, p. 143) “At a national level, in 1992, nearly all home care service hours were 
provided by home care employees from the public sector, but by 1998 nearly half were from the ‘independent sector’ 
(both non-profit and private companies). Most of the subcontracted providers are for-profit companies”. 
7 This trend has assumed dramatic proportions in East Germany. Before unification, there were huge differences in the 
structure of supply between the East and West. From 1991 to 2001, the share of public providers in the new Länder 
decreased from 80% to 15%, while the market share of private providers increased from 0.8% to 21% and that of non-
profit providers from 20% to 64%. As a result, in East Germany the providing structures have almost completely 
aligned with the patterns of West Germany, despite persisting wide differences in economic and social  conditions 
(Kümmerling 2006). 
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 Table 4.    Type of firms in the care market (% of total), 2003-06  
    
 Public Non-
profit 
For-profit 
Germany    
   Home care 2 43 55 
   Nursing homes 7 55 37 
Austria    
   Home care 90 10 
   Residential care 51 27 22 
France    
   Home care1 35 60 5 
   Residential care2 60 26 14 
Italy      
   Home care3 n.a 69 n.a 
   Residential care 48 35 17 
Spain    
   Residential care 40 n.a. n.a. 
UK    
   Home care4 n.a. n.a. 72 
   Residential care 7 17 71 
 
Notes: 1 = number of organisations; 2 = number of places;  
3 = % of social workers; 4 = expenditure. 
 Source: National Reports. 
 
 
The shift to home care, and the consequent delay in institutionalisation, will require reorganisation 
of the entire care chain through redefinition of the services necessary to assist the elderly at home, 
reallocation of investment and infrastructure among hospitals, nursing homes, community services 
and (smart) houses, the skills required in each segment, the right mix of support services for home 
and community-based care. With health services more dispersed in the community, closer 
coordination between home care and home nursing activities will be necessary to guarantee the 
continuity of care and to assist the carer by means of the various support measures. At the other end 
of the care chain, with the average period spent in residential care decreasing, the share of residents 
with greater nursing and health needs will increase. This will require the ‘re-medicalisation’ of 
nursing homes so as to cope with the greater nursing and medical needs of residents (OECD 2005 p. 
86), and the conversion of a large proportion of residential houses into nursing homes. This will 
entail change in their organisation and in their demand for skills, with effects on their costs and 
balance sheets.  
 
The shift to monetary transfers and private provision is intended to enhance the role of the market 
and to promote efficiency by favouring the reorganisation of the care sector into a multiplicity of 
competing actors. This raises issues concerning the regulatory oversight of care options, control 
over the quality of care as well as the working conditions of workers in the care labour market. 
Since the private market for care is still closely dependent on public funding,8 even when the 
                                                 
8 In the UK, for instance, social care is mainly provided by the independent sector, but mainly financed by the state. In 
2004, 60% of domiciliary care providers were reliant on local authorities for more than three-quarters of their business, 
up from 46% in 2000 (Urwin and Rubery 2007).  
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state/local authority contracts out its services, it can retain governance and coordination of private 
provision, thereby ensuring quality standards. However, whilst a drive towards private provision is 
deemed compatible with a strong public role in guidance and supervision, which sets the standards 
for skills, working conditions and quality of care, opinions differ as to what should be the right 
degree of competition in the ‘social’ market for care. Thus, governance is exerted to very different 
extents among countries. The market is highly regulated in some countries (as in Austria - where 
competition is restricted and market shares are allocated by the government - and in Germany). In 
the UK, the state has governed the contracting-out process by maintaining control over quality. In 
Italy, the public sector finances the spontaneous organisation of the market without ‘governing’ it 
(Spano 2006, p. 65). In Italy, again, tight control over public provision goes hand in hand with 
complete neglect of what happens outside the public sphere: local authorities in some regions try to 
govern the market for publicly-funded social care via ‘tacit’ agreements on market shares allocation 
among various social cooperatives, whilst others are more willing to sustain competition in the 
social market as a way to ensure quality and cost efficiency. Working conditions (and quality of 
care) may be more difficult to safeguard when, as in the Mediterranean countries, families act as 
employers in a largely informal market. The public authority can exert control by attaching 
conditions to the granting of allowances. In Spain, for instance, companies authorised to perform 
elderly care functions must comply with the conditions concerning employment, pay, and the 
quality of services stipulated by the local municipality (Miguélez, Lope and Olivares 2006). In 
Italy, attempts to coordinate care workers (mainly immigrants) directly employed by families are 
currently under way, especially through credentialing, professional or training courses, and 
organisation into cooperatives. It should be noted, however, that quality standards may conflict with 
budget constraints, so that attempts to improve working conditions in the sector are severely 
undermined. This is especially true when local authorities set prices and quality standards for 
private firms. 
 
2.2 The financing of care 
  
Care regimes - that is, the ways in which the financing and provision of care are organised in the 
various systems - differ in their capacities to create a care market, either social or private. In fact, 
how the care market works depends as much on the system of funding as it does on the way in 
which funds are disbursed. Systems relying on in-kind provision, contracting-out and ‘tied’ in-cash 
allowances (to be used to hire private carers) are the most effective in creating a formal market. 
Conversely, those systems that rely mostly on in-cash unconditional allowances (monetary 
transfers) have slowed down the creation of a formal market for care, encouraging instead supply 
from the informal market consisting of either family carers or carers hired by the family in the 
market. Analysis of the effects of disbursement on the care market is of utmost importance, given 
the common trend towards more cash benefits and the Mediterranean countries’ recent move to 
create a national fund for dependency. 
 
Two groups can be distinguished: countries which rely mostly on in-kind provision, either directly 
or via contracting-out (Sweden, UK) or with a greater reliance on conditional cash allowances paid 
to hire an external regular carer (as in the French system); countries which rely mostly on 
unconditional allowances paid to the family carer (e.g. care insurance in Austria and in Germany, 
and the attendance allowance in Italy).  
 
In the first group of countries, the care regime has favoured the creation of a formal market for care. 
In Sweden, municipalities are the main providers of care for older people, and public providers 
cover 95% of services; although, as noted in the previous section, Sweden exhibits the common 
trend towards the contracting-out of services for older persons (Ahmed and Anxo 2006). In the UK, 
services are provided by local government and by the private sector on contract to local 
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governments, with the share of the public sector declining drastically since the 1980s. In France, the 
policy on care allowances has been distinctive by explicitly linking the provision of services to the 
elderly (and other family services) with the creation of jobs, the specific intention being to reduce 
long-term unemployment and to drain the informal market (Dherbey et al. 1996, Jenson and 
Jacobzone 2000; Lima 2006). Since the beginning of the 1990s, various schemes9 have been 
designed both to address the needs of vulnerable categories and to create jobs. French beneficiaries 
of the home care allowance must spend it on care (and they must be able to prove they have done 
so), and they can use the allowance to purchase care from family members (other than spouses or 
partners) only if the latter are unemployed. In the late 1990s it was estimated that this policy had 
achieved its primary goal of expanding regular employment and formalizing care arrangements 
(Jenson and Jacobzone 2000): recipients tended to hire outside caregivers over family members by a 
margin of two to one. 
 
A feature shared by Germany and Austria is that their care systems are based on mandatory care 
insurance largely paid in cash with no strings attached. Long term insurance only provides limited 
cover (table 5)10: the allowance is meant, in fact, to act as a strong incentive for ‘self-support’ 
(Hermann 2006). The Austrian care allowance (Pflegegeld) is unconditional and not means tested; it 
can only be paid in cash (either to the dependent person or to the family carer); and it can be used 
either to pay the family carer or to hire a service in the market, or to pay for residential care. The 
amount of the benefit is linked to the degree of disability: more than half of all recipients (56.7%) 
are at level one or two of the care allowance scheme, that is, up to 273.40 euros in 2006, equal to 75 
hours per month (Hermann 2006). There are additional benefits, provided by the provincial 
governments through social assistance, which are means tested and aimed at people in financial 
need. 
 
 
 Table 5.   Cash transfers: maximum allowance* 
 
 
Austria 
(2006) 
 
Germany° 
(2006) 
 
Italy^ 
(2006) 
 
France 
(2006) 
 
1562 
 
665 
 
450 
 
1169 
 
* Highest level of disability  
°Maximum value for benefits in-kind: 1432 euros  
  ^Italy: Attendance allowance only. 
 Source: National Reports 
 
 
The German care insurance (Pflegeversicherung) can be paid either in kind or in cash, or as a 
combination of both. The cash payment is significantly lower than the direct service benefit: for a 
given degree of disability, the in-kind transfer is about twice the cash transfer (table 5). In-kind 
transfers can be used only to purchase legally defined health services. The service provider must be 
a professional carer and must have an agreement with the LTC insurer. The latter ensures that 
                                                 
9 The Prestation spécifique dependence (PSD),  the Allocation personalisée d’autonomie (APA) and, since January 
2006  the Chèque Emploie Service Universel (employment voucher). 
10 It is estimated that in 2001 additional funds in the Austrian system totalled between 1.6 and 3 billion Euros, as against 
1.69 billion Euros, or 0.8% of GDP, for the federal allowance (Hermann 2006). In France a low income elderly person 
(earning 7756 euros) at the highest level of dependence must spend 67% of his/her income to make up the total cost of 
care (Lima 2006). 
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providers fulfil certain standards, such as a specific share of care professionals among their 
employees (Arntz, Michaelis and Spermann 2006). Anyone receiving cash benefits must request 
care advice from a professional care service, but the benefit can be used for any type of purchase, 
including gratuities for relatives (Arntz et al. 2007). Although applications for cash benefits in 
Germany seem to be slightly decreasing, in 2002 more than half of recipients opted for the in-cash 
payment (table 6). Similarly, 81% of Austrian recipients have used the allowance to recompense 
family care (compare these numbers with France, where recipients tend to hire outside – regular – 
caregivers by a margin of two to one).    
 
 
 Table 6.   Use of Insurance allowance: Germany and Austria, 2002 
 
 Germany Austria 
 % of recipients % of recipients 
Cash allowance 50.4 80 
In kind/mixed 19.1 5 
Residential care 30.5 15 
 
 Source: Kümmerling (2006); Hermann (2006). 
 
 
The combination of unconditional money transfers favouring informal care with a closely regulated 
system of qualifications and professional degrees has produced a dualistic market. This outcome is 
more pronounced in Austria, where immigrants from Eastern Europe make up large part of the 
market (section 4 below).  
 
In the Mediterranean countries, the limited public involvement in care financing explains the failure 
of those countries to develop a formal care market for older people and the dominance of individual 
suppliers. In Italy, public funds have been used largely to recompense the family carer. Two types 
of allowances – tied and untied – coexist. The attendance allowance for dependent persons with 
severe disabilities is not ‘tied’: it is not means tested, nor is it conditional on the family structure of 
the person in need (it amounted to € 450 per month in 2006). The care allowance is means tested 
and is granted by local authorities to elderly people at risk of institutionalisation. It is usually 
smaller and much less widespread than the attendance allowance, but the local authorities can more 
easily subject its payment to compliance with rules. As well as these allowances, every elderly 
person can rely on at least a minimum pension amounting to approximately 450 euros. Although 
payment of the care allowance has been made increasingly conditional on the hiring of regular 
immigrant carers in order to reduce the size of the informal market, the prevalence of unconditional 
monetary transfers, in an unregulated labour market with a large informal economy, has led to the 
development of a large supply of irregular, often undocumented, immigrant carers.  
 
At the cost of simplification, we may argue that when comparing care regimes, much of the 
difference among them derives from the way in which financing is disbursed. Their insurance 
schemes notwithstanding, in fact, Austria and Germany can still be described as having a “publicly 
facilitated, private care model” (Bettio and Plantenga 2004). Contrary to the Beveridge-oriented 
care regimes, care is provided mostly in private or informal manner; but in contrast to the 
Mediterranean countries, costs are “partly compensated by collective arrangements” (Hermann 
2006). To conclude, the decision to emphasize cash benefits instead of agency-based services – 
which has been explained by the need to promote greater consumer choice and control over service 
options (OECD 2005) – may affect much more than consumer choice alone. By transforming 
dependent elderly people and their families from service users into service buyers and employers of 
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care workers, the increased use of care allowances and vouchers affects family care-giving 
responsibilities and the structure of the care market.  
 
 
3. National employment models and the supply of care workers 
 
3.1 The care labour market 
National employment models shape the features of the care labour market: in fact, they affect the 
quantity and the quality of the care labour supply, the size of the care labour shortage, and the 
degree of dependence on migrant carers.  
 
Table 7.    Total employment in the elder care sector 
 
 Germany 
(2003) 
England1 
(2003/4 
Sweden 
2004 
Austria2 
2002 
France Italy 
2004 
Greece 
2001 
Spain 
2003 
Home/Domiciliary 
care 
200,897 (163,000)  3,400 800,0003 30,000   
Nursing homes/ 
Residential care 
Homes 
 
510,857 
 
(462,000)
  
16,963 
 
134,0002 
 
125,000 
  
irregular workers 
(estimates) 
   (40000)  (500,000)  (50000) 
Total 711,754 625,000 239,500 20,636 934,000 655,000 21,3254 1500005
Population >65 
per employee6 
20.9 12.5  6.4 61.1 
(20.8) 
10.7 88.9 
(17) 
92.7 47.7 
(35.8) 
 
Notes: 1According to Wanless (2006, p. 122), total employment in services for older people in 
2003-04 in England alone was 680,000. For the UK as a whole the figures for the two main care 
roles are 111,677 for social workers and 640,686 care assistants and home carers (Source: ONS 
Annual Population Survey 2006, in Experian, 2007, figure 1). The figure for the UK is 2.6. 
2full-time equivalent. Austria: the number of employees in home care may be three times higher, 
because most home care workers work part-time. 
3 Registered as domestic workers, not all of them are working with the elderly. 
4 Total employment in the social care sector. 
5 25,000 of them in Social Services Centres. 
6 The ratio including estimated irregular carers in parentheses. 
Source: Employment in the elderly care sector: National Reports; Population over 65 years of age 
(2004): Eurostat, Population and Social Conditions, 2007. 
 
Two characteristics of the care market – its integration within the broader social sector and the high 
share of the informal market – make it difficult to obtain reliable data relating to elderly care. 
Moreover, different labour markets co-exist within the long-term care sector: skilled workers, such 
as registered nurses; unlicensed low-skilled assistants and other workers providing personal care; 
domestic service workers providing home help with domestic chores. Because of the credentialing 
processes involved, more data are available on licensed workers. In general, however, the 
boundaries among different qualifications tend to be blurred because unskilled workers often have 
to perform care tasks as well, such as personal cleaning and (elementary) nursing. The contiguity of 
long-term care with health and social services means that flows between these sectors are quite 
common. Because the markets, the credentialing, and the data gathering are not distinct, data 
usually relate to broad categories of workers (Redfoot and Houser 2005). For these reasons, 
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estimates of total employment (table 7) should be treated with caution. When irregular carers are 
included (when estimates are available) one observes a convergence across countries in the ratios of 
‘carers’ to the population aged over 65. 
 
Pay and working conditions. Generally speaking, elderly care is characterised as a low-pay, low-
status sector. Long-term care workers share many of the same features across countries. The 
overwhelming majority of care workers are female, and many are aged 45 and above, which is 
somewhat older than the total workforce average. They face problems concerning pay, hours, 
training, and status. Coverage by collective agreements varies across countries and between public 
and private providers; fragmentation of unions among skills and tasks, the decentralisation and 
fragmentation of bargaining, encouraged by the fragmentation of employers (public, private 
subcontractor, for-profit, non-profit): these are features common to all countries. 
  
There is a wide disparity in working conditions across employers and types of care. Pay and 
conditions are usually worse for staff employed by private contractors compared to in-house staff 
directly employed by public institutions, and for workers in home care compared to those in 
residential care. Indeed, better public sector working conditions, which translate into higher labour 
costs, have encouraged the contracting-out of services to private  providers. Low wages (generally 
lower than the national average) and poor employment conditions result in very high turnover rates 
and recruitment problems, in large part because of competition from equally low-pay, but less 
stressful sectors. Unskilled workers often move to and from jobs in a variety of service industries as 
opportunities arise. In the UK, for instance, minimum wage legislation has been important in setting 
a standard wage for low pay sectors, so that it may have increased exits from care to other minimum 
wage paying sectors (such as supermarkets), which have less demanding working conditions. A 
similar trend can be observed in Italy: after regularisation, immigrant workers seek to move into 
public services, or out of care into other sectors (such as hotels). Atypical contracts are common, 
but high turnover and vacancies seem to be due more to poor job quality than to job precariousness, 
given the existence of excess demand for care labour in most countries. Turnover rates are higher in 
private than in public services, so that they are higher in those countries in which commercial 
services dominate the market (Christopherson 1997).  
 
Working time arrangements vary widely across countries and employers, so that an increase in 
demand for care during ‘unsocial’ hours is met in different ways: part time, shifts, around the clock 
co-residing minders. In general, part time in care reflects the features of the national employment 
model, being generally higher in countries where it is widespread. On the other hand, where 
opportunities for part-time in other sectors of the economy are scarce, as in Italy’s high-
employment Northern regions, elderly care provides a way out for young mothers in need of part-
time jobs so that they can reconcile work and family care. Many care workers put in uncompensated 
time (for example, in care planning or client-to-client travel), which decreases their effective 
earnings per hour. 
  
Skills, training, and credentialing. There are wide cross-countries differences in the levels of 
education, training and credentialing for formal care workers, and they closely reflect the country’s 
national employment model. Generally speaking, such levels are mostly low for care workers in the 
Mediterranean countries, France and the UK: employers offer induction programmes that may last 
for anything between two days and two weeks. They are reasonably high for skilled and semi-
skilled workers in the vocational systems of Austria and Germany, and they are the highest in 
Scandinavian countries.  
 
Scandinavian welfare regimes are associated with high levels of services, large workforces and 
relatively good employment conditions. Sweden’s system of long-term care services is designed to 
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support women in the workplace and to professionalize care-giving to older people needing help. 
Compared to other countries, Sweden requires the highest levels of education among caregivers and 
pays the highest wages. Anxo and Fagan (2005, p. 140) observe that “The qualifications levels 
required for entry to home care work have generally been rising in Nordic countries, from a base 
that is already high compared to the situation in some other countries such as the UK. Thus in 
Finland and Sweden, three years of training in upper secondary school is now a typical entry 
requirement”. According to some estimates (Alaby 2005), ten percent of long-term care workers 
have university degrees in health and social work, and the other 90 percent are nurse assistants and 
home-helpers; approximately 60 percent of these paraprofessional workers have completed 
vocational training. Sweden is thus in relatively good shape regarding its supply of nurses, 
physicians and health care professionals. In the UK, social workers are expected to be qualified and 
registered with the relevant authority. However, care service jobs have been traditionally classed as 
manual work, and they have required no formal qualifications for entry (in line with many manual 
jobs in the UK labour markets). With the increasing marketisation of services, cost pressures have 
reinforced the development of a low-paid and casualised workforce (Urwin and Rubery 2006; 
Escobedo et al. 2002).  
 
In France, the development of long term care services has reflected an employment policy intended 
to increase labour force participation among low-skilled persons (Korzcyk 2004). This policy has 
encouraged private contracts,11 with negative effects on pay and work and care quality. Pensioners 
employing home helps are subject to all the requirements applicable to employers, but they benefit 
from an abatement of payroll taxes on wages paid to these workers. The chèque emploie service is 
the instrument devised to favour regularisation and to prevent the creation of an informal market. It 
proves the existence of a regular contract, and it is required when application is made for rebates on 
taxes and social contributions. Private contracts tend to pay less than formal jobs with private or 
government agencies,12 and they do not offer a career ladder. Lower wages give limited incentives 
to employees to seek training that might improve their earnings, career mobility, and the quality of 
care that they provide. Consequently, whilst both the allowance and the availability of family 
employment may have increased the number of formal care jobs, they may also have increased the 
proportion of care jobs governed by inherently precarious personal services contracts rather than 
more stable employer-employee relationships (Christopherson 1997; Korzcyk 2004). By making the 
direct employment of home carers more advantageous (because of fiscal benefits), this policy has 
favoured the transformation of non-profit organisations from direct providers into labour agencies 
(intermediating between demand and supply) (Lima 2006). As a consequence of the policy, the care 
workforce in France has been split into two broad groups. One group of workers has the formal 
training necessary to pursue a career; the other group is essentially unskilled, with few prospects of 
upward mobility (Christopherson 1997). The evolution of training in the French home help sector 
has reflected the tension between the development of home help as a service with increasingly 
complex professional demands and as an employment programme. If a programme is designed to 
meet the needs of the long-term unemployed (or those never employed), the result may be the 
creation of an employment sector reserved for those with no other options. Such a programme may 
produce jobs, but these are jobs for an underclass which do not offer career tracks and upward 
mobility13. On the other hand, if one focuses on the needs of the service user, the emphasis shifts to 
                                                 
11 Various laws, primarily a 1991 law creating the job category of family employment (employs familiaux), have made 
it easier for individual workers to establish private contracts with clients rather than working through private or 
government agencies. These arrangements added a substantial number of jobs in the early 1990s (Christopherson 1997). 
12 Private contracts — in which the beneficiary is the employer — tend to pay at or about the minimum wage, while 
home care jobs through agencies pay as much as 50 percent more. Nevertheless, the minimum wage is judged to 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family, and it is revised whenever the cost-of-living index rises by 
2 percentage points (Korzcyk 2004). 
13 There is a strong competition in the provision of low-level qualifications in home support services. These certificates 
are quite different from the qualifications required in institutional care, which have a strong health bias, and the entry of 
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developing appropriate professional skills and the tools with which to measure and promote quality, 
rather than the programme’s impact on employment. Some observers consequently believe that 
France has made? a trade-off between increasing access to employment for untrained workers and 
increasing employee qualifications to improve service quality, and they conclude that the system 
has privileged employment generation over the quality of care and jobs (Korzcyk 2004). It should 
be noted, however, that the Scandinavian countries show that treating care work as a source of jobs 
and using it to provide needed services are goals that do not necessarily conflict with quality. 
 
In Austria and Germany, the professional system is finely divided, and a complex array of 
credentials are required from workers to practice their professions. Different levels of skills, 
sanctioned by various levels of licenses and credentials, determine a complex segmentation of the 
care market. In Austria, there are two different levels of qualifications: for skilled and semi-skilled 
staff. The former consists of graduate nurses, while semi-skilled staff includes assistant nurses and 
home helps. Graduate nurses must complete a three-year course, but their diploma does not count as 
a higher-education entrance qualification. Assistant nurses must complete a one-year course (the 
one for home assistants is much shorter). Courses are offered by a multiplicity of institutions, and 
retraining courses have been organised for unemployed or existing care workers. The lack of 
country-wide training standards means that assistant nurses must obtain formal approval of their 
training certificates when they move to another province. Although the proportion of skilled staff 
has increased over time, it is increasingly difficulty to find skilled personnel, in particular for home 
care services (Hermann 2006). In Germany since 2003, elderly care work has been an autonomous 
profession with standardized vocational training. The contents of the training are regulated by the 
federal law on care for elderly people, although the training itself is the responsibility of the 
Regions. Trainees are required to have a leaving certificate from secondary school (Realschule or 
equivalent) and the duration of the training is three years (full time), followed by a six-month 
probationary period. Employees withprofessional training are qualified as nurses or as elderly care 
workers. Home care is provided by professional staff, with whom the LTC insurance funds stipulate 
supply contracts. Germany does not have a shortage of adequately trained nurses and elderly care 
workers. The recent (and still ongoing) structural changes in the hospital sector have led to a severe 
cutback in jobs (a minimum reduction of beds by 30% is expected). Hence there is currently enough 
staff available for recruitment by nursing homes and/or home care services (in competition with 
elderly care workers). On the lower skill level, the demand for elderly care workers has been 
satisfied by so-called retrainees (Umschüler) who have attended training courses partly supported 
by the Agency for Labour. Yet, in their endeavour to reduce costs, private providers are employing 
under-qualified or untrained staff to an extent largely in excess of the 50% rate of fully trained 
personnel (Fachkraftquote) per establishment fixed by law. As a consequence, the share of unskilled 
workers and people under-qualified for their jobs is rapidly increasing (the proportion sextupled 
between 1996 and 1999). In recent years, a parallel market for (often illegal and mainly East 
European female) health care workers seems to have emerged. The combination of qualified and 
unqualified workers, and irregular workers, points up a high degree of labour segmentation. 
 
In the Mediterranean countries, the labour market for elderly care largely consists of informal 
carers. These workers, as well as many of those in the formal market, have low levels of education 
and skills. In the case of immigrant carers, the level of education may be fairly high but not focused 
on care, so that there may be a mismatch of qualifications – as in the case of immigrants to Italy 
from Eastern Europe. Public action aimed at encouraging worker upskilling and professionalisation 
of the sector is on the rise everywhere, both through training courses and certifications, and through 
more stringent regulations and credentialing. Training is indeed necessary to ensure good-quality 
care, and to provide the horizontal and vertical career mobility required to keep workers in the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
social sector diplomas into sectors traditionally attached to the health sector is perceived as a threat by the unions and 
associations representing nursing auxiliaries (Lima 2006). 
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profession. Moreover, the training of care workers, particularly those who provide home care, 
grows increasingly important as medical advances and the shift to home care permit more persons 
with complex needs to live in the community rather than in specialized institutions.14 Training 
policies are not without problems, however. Firstly, training often does not pay in terms of wages or 
career. In many countries, there is easy access to lower-skilled occupations in elder care, but little 
vertical or horizontal mobility once workers are in the profession. This lack of career mobility may 
turn care work into a dead-end occupation, both in the perception of potential employees and in fact 
(Korzcyk 2004, p.6). Access to more professionalized occupations, such as nursing, requires 
advanced formal training and often totally separate curricula. The segmentation of the market is 
highest where the professional system is most finely defined (as in Germany and Austria), or where 
there is a large presence of illegal/irregular carers: attempts to increased the qualification level of 
lower-skilled workers (e.g. immigrant care workers in Italy) may be opposed by other, less-
professionalized (national) care workers, or by health professionals (as in France and Germany). 
Since most training and credentialing is done at the local level, there is the risk that it may lack 
recognition at the regional or national level, while the fragmentation of training courses may create 
a barrier to upward mobility. 
Making regulations and credentialing more stringent may also conflict with the characteristics of 
the supply of carers: in Spain – where educational requirements in the public sector are both 
rigorous and formalised and local governments stipulate that companies offering home care services 
must hire workers with at least 750 hours of family work training - there is concern that regulation 
of training requirements and qualifications may expel women with lower educations. Conversely, 
many workers are over-qualified for the positions they occupy, as in the case of foreign nurses and 
other professional care workers in the UK (Experia 2007). 
 
3.2 The labour shortage and immigrant carers 
 
Demand for care labour is increasing rapidly everywhere and all countries are experiencing 
problems in recruiting enough workers to meet demand. In some countries the shortage of care 
worker has been met by a large inflow of  immigrant, mostly female, workers. The trend in migrant 
‘carers’ reflects the features of overall migration flows. In the EU, the inflow of foreigners has 
grown rapidly in recent decades, with significant differences among countries. All Mediterranean 
countries display high levels of immigration, and even higher flows of undocumented immigrants, 
while Scandinavian countries host a limited number of foreigners. The picture is more mixed for the 
western continental countries, with Austria and France experiencing a marked growth of inflows, 
and Germany a declining trend. Finally, in the UK the upward trend is pronounced, and especially 
so since the EU enlargement to the so-called A8 countries (Ambrosini and Barone 2007) (table 8). 
                                                 
14The share of qualified workers is generally higher in home care than in residential care, although there is a trend 
towards a decrease in qualified workers in home care which may reflect shortages of qualified workers (Austria) as well 
as a finer division of tasks (Italy) aimed at saving on (more expensive) skilled labour.   
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Table 8.    Proportion of non-nationals in total population and in total labour force, 2006 
 
 Proportion of non-nationals in 
total population 
Proportion of non-nationals in 
total labour force 
EU27* 4.4 5.2 
Austria 9.8 10.3 
France 4.8 5.1 
Germany 8.7 9.1 
Greece 5.0 6.3 
Italy 5.0° n.a. 
Spain 8.7 12.3 
Sweden 3.8 4.6 
UK 5.7 6.3 
 
Notes: * EU27 totals are based on the available country data.  
   Non-nationals: legal, permanent migrants only.  
°   Italy: 2007. 
Source:   Ambrosini and Barone (2007) on Eurostat data.  
For Italy: Istat, La popolazione straniera residente in Italia al 1 gennaio 2007, Statistiche in 
breve, Roma, 2 Ottobre 2007. 
 
 
Two factors make estimates of the actual flows of immigrants difficult. Different definitions of 
‘immigrants’ and ‘foreign born nationals’,15 as well as differences in the amounts of naturalised 
foreigners, make cross-country comparisons unreliable. How, in fact, should second or third 
generation ‘immigrants’ – be they Turks or ‘ethnic Germans’ in Germany, Estonians in Finland, 
North-Africans in France, or Asians in the UK – be considered? In some countries, such as France, 
statistics do not distinguish by ethnicity or national origin. Used here is a ‘flow’ definition of 
immigrant, that is, a person of foreign nationality who has migrated to engage in care work - like 
most of the nurses actively recruited by the UK or the female carers migrating to Austria on a 
rotating basis – or who may have ended up in the care sector since this was the only work that 
he/she could find – as in the case of the first wave of female immigrant carers in the Mediterranean 
countries. 
 
The second factor has to do with undocumented immigrants. It is difficult to find reliable data on 
undocumented migrants, and varied and conflicting estimates have been produced. Generally 
speaking, their presence is higher in those countries with a flourishing informal economy, and they 
are concentrated in those sectors where the informal economy is most widespread: care and 
domestic services, hotels and catering, tourism, construction, and agriculture (UWT 2007). The 
informal economies preceded undocumented migration and acted as a strong pull factor; but 
subsequently the two processes reinforced one another, thus helping to strengthen the process of 
immigrant labour casualisation (Bettio, Simonazzi and Villa 2006). 
 
                                                 
15 Most countries (with few exceptions, such as the US and France) link citizenship to ethnicity rather than place of 
birth (OECD 2005a). This affects the comparability of the data. For example, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans 
migrated to Germany after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. These migrants receive automatic citizenship and 
are characterised as Germans in the country’s data systems, while ethnic Turks who have lived for generations in 
Germany often do not have citizenship there and are characterised as “foreign”. The OECD’s 2004 report on migration 
makes major strides in distinguishing data on “foreign” from data on “foreign-born” to give a more accurate picture of 
international migration patterns (Redfoot and Houser 2005). 
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The magnitude of the labour shortage in the LTC sector, in total and across the skill spectrum, the 
extent of recourse to migration to fill the gap, and the modes of migrant involvement in the labour 
market differ widely across countries and across the various segments of the care labour market. 
The UK is one of the largest importers of professional health care workers, a large percentage of 
whom work in the long-term care system, but it has not relied on immigrants for unskilled, personal 
care. Germany by contrast, has not experienced a lack of professional workers, while a parallel 
market for (often illegal and mainly East European female) health care workers seems to have 
emerged in recent years. These workers co-reside with the elderly person round-the-clock, and stay 
for a three-month period on a rotating basis.16  Illegal carers are incomparably cheap17 and raise 
serious competition against home service providers (the latter have reported an up to 30% loss of 
turnover according to Neue Caritas, 2006, quoted in Kümmerling 2006). Substantial cash benefits, 
little regulatory oversight, and a tradition of home care have encouraged extensive use of foreign 
care workers in Austria. Many of them are illegal but are openly recruited by agencies for short-
term, rotating care work. Legal immigrant carers are more numerous in residential care (where they 
account for two-thirds of staff), than in home care, mostly because of language problems (while 
language does not seem to be a problem for the employment of undeclared workers in households) 
(Hermann 2006). Mediterranean countries, too, have relied on immigrant workers to supplement 
family carers; unlike in the UK, many of these workers are undocumented immigrants, hired 
informally by families through informal networks or through the church. In the three Mediterranean 
countries, foreign (mostly female) workers furnish an increasing share of home care: the 
underground economy covers one-third of the market in Spain, where language is less of a problem, 
since workers migrate from Latin American countries. More or less legal flows from bordering 
Eastern countries are supplying the market for informal carers in Greece and Italy. Conversely, 
France and Sweden seem to rely least on immigrant carers. In Sweden, substantial public spending 
has resulted in a largely native workforce, which is well paid and highly trained. There is a small 
but growing number of foreign-born workers mostly employed by public agencies. In spite of a very 
different employment policy, native care workers are still predominant in France.  
 
Foreign long-term care workers fill the gaps in the care chain; they are more likely to take jobs in 
the less desirable tasks or segments of the market; and they do not compete with professional care 
workers. In some countries (e.g. Finland), selective immigration policies shield the most sensitive 
(or the more organised) segments against competition. Differences among countries in their reliance 
on foreign workers thus derive from the different shortages across the skill spectrum. These in turn 
are produced by the combined effect of the various long-term care regimes and employment 
policies (along with their past histories as countries of immigration and their past and current views 
and policies on immigration). Whilst differences in the organisation and financing of care impact 
upon the creation of a market for care (as argued in section 2), labour market characteristics and 
working conditions, as shaped by the national employment model, affect the supply of a ‘native’ 
workforce and its professional skills.  
 
4. Care regimes and national employment models 
 
4.1 Formal and informal markets 
 
Interaction between care regimes and the national employment models has produced very different 
results in terms of the quantity and quality of the “domestic” labour supply, and it may explain the 
                                                 
16 It has been estimated that there were about 5,000 foreign illegal care givers in Germany in 2002, but they were not 
distributed uniformly across the country. 
17 It is estimated that illegal carers earn about one tenth of the pay of legal carers, between 600 and 800 Euro plus board 
and lodging. Similarly, in Austria the pay of an irregular immigrant carer is 7E/h compared with 24E for a trained care 
worker. 
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differing capacity to meet increasing demand for care either by using native workers or instead by 
resorting to immigrant workers to cope with labour shortages. The rest of this section presents a 
comparative analysis of the various models. The countries examined can be classified in different 
clusters according to the prevalence of formal or informal care labour markets and to the degree of 
reliance on immigrant care workers (figure 1). As argued in section 2, care regimes differ in their 
capacities to create a care market, either social or private. Systems relying on in-kind provision 
(Sweden), contracting-out (the UK), and ‘tied’ in-cash allowances to be used to hire private carers 
(France) fall within the formal market grouping. Systems relying mostly on in-cash unconditional 
allowances or monetary transfers (Austria, Germany and the Mediterranean countries) fall within 
the informal or mixed categories, depending on the amount and conditionality of public funding. 
 
 
Figure 1.      Care regimes and employment models 
 
Care Regimes 
 
 Formal Market Mixed Informal 
market 
 
Native 
 
Sweden, France
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UK 
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Source: National reports. 
 
 
Policies favouring the creation of a care market have obvious effects on the supply of labour, in 
particular female labour. Those countries that have opted for a high provision of services have the 
highest female participation rates, and the Mediterranean familistic welfare regimes the lowest18. 
This may go some way towards explaining the size of the domestic supply of care workers. 
However, shortages across the skill spectrum, as well as differences in care quality, are affected also 
by the specific features of the national employment models. The UK, Sweden and France have 
favoured the creation of a formal market for care, thus falling within the first column, but they have 
had different experiences in terms of supply of domestic care labour.  
 
The different characteristics of the employment models in the UK and in Sweden have resulted in 
widely differentiated shortages of care workers and consequently different amounts of recourse to 
immigrant labour. Sweden’s supply of care workers consists mainly of native workers. While 
                                                 
18 In Germany long-term care insurance has led to a massive improvement in the long-term care infrastructure and to the 
creation of more jobs in the care sector. A total of over 250,000 new jobs have been created since the introduction of the 
insurance (MISSOC-INFO 2006). The link between care regime and employment creation is acknowledged also in 
Spain’s debate on dependence. According to the data contained in the White Book, the implementation of the new law 
on dependence is expected to generate 300,000 jobs. 
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demand for foreign-born workers may increase, Sweden is determined to prevent the onset of a low-
skilled, low-paid market for irregular eldercare workers. The 10-year action plan for long-term care 
(discussed in 2006) focuses on policies to improve employment and working conditions in order to 
recruit and sustain a stable long-term care workforce.19 Conversely, the UK is experiencing severe 
problems of across-the-board labour shortages. Staffing difficulties are now sufficiently severe to 
impinge on the implementation of government policies (Urwin and Rubery 2006). Low wages and 
other poor employment conditions, low levels of educational attainment, a negative public image of 
social care work, organisational aspects which reduce job satisfaction (e.g. constant change, poor 
management), and the stress of the work are at the basis of the difficulty faced by the sector in 
workforce recruitment and retention. The increasing role of the private (mainly for-profit) sector in 
care services in the UK may be exacerbating these problems. Increasing marketisation of services, 
combined with budget constraints, has put pressure on costs, encouraging the development of a low 
paid and casualised workforce. A workforce of this type tends to attract transient, temporary 
workers and to have a relatively high staff turnover. In France, as argued, the development of long 
term care services has reflected an employment policy intended to increase labour force 
participation among low-skilled persons, favour regularisation and drain the informal market. This 
policy has encouraged the supply of a native work force.  
 
Because of their use of monetary transfers to promote informal/family carers, Germany and Austria 
combine features of both formal and informal markets. In Austria, cash benefits, coupled with little 
regulatory oversight, a tradition of home care, the permeability of the  country’s Eastern borders 
(due also to historical ties) have encouraged a large inflow of migrant carers, many of whom are 
illegal but are openly recruited by agencies for short-term, rotating care duties (Hermann 2006). In 
Germany, in spite of the prevalence of unconditional cash benefits, reliance on illegal foreign 
workers does not yet seem to have reached similar proportions (Kummerling 2006). This explains 
the allocation of the two countries to different cells: a strongly regulated market for skilled labour, 
combined with their use of monetary transfers to incentivate informal family carers, justifies their 
inclusion in a ‘mixed’ cluster to take account of the coexistence of formal and informal care 
markets, albeit with differing reliance on foreign minders. 
 
In regard to the Mediterranean countries, the limited amount of public involvement in care 
financing explains their failure to develop a formal private market of paid care for older people and 
the dominance of individual suppliers. The unconditional character of monetary transfers, in an 
unregulated labour market with a large grey economy, has led to the development of a large supply 
or irregular, often undocumented, immigrant carers to fill the gap in the supply of affordable care 
workers. These workers compete with the less-qualified ones employed in the private, formal 
market. Evidence that, in some areas, the commercial sector may be fighting back by formally 
hiring immigrants (Simonazzi 2006) is indicative of how close the skills of the two groups are. 
 
We can conclude that the low pay and low status that are distinctive features of the sector do not 
seem to be related to immigrant labour. The opposite is the case: low pay, low status, and 
immigration are instead affected by the features of the national employment model. 
 
4.2 Future scenarios  
The first huge flow of illegal migrants into the Southern European countries occurred in the 
aftermath of the collapse of Eastern European socialist regimes. This flow was attracted by the size 
                                                 
19 Basic skill requirements for nurse assistants and home care personnel, and a system of recognition and registration to 
increase the status of the occupation are among the various measures under discussion. There are also ongoing projects 
to improve on-the-job training and supervision for care workers and to provide support for their next of kin (Alaby 
2005). 
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of the underground economies of the Mediterranean countries, and it fuelled the development of the 
‘Mediterranean care model’. Since EU enlargement, most migration from Eastern Europe has 
become ‘internal’ (although with large differences among receiving countries’ migration policies).20 
Legal immigrants can now choose between continuing as ‘irregular’ workers, as in the 
Mediterranean countries and Austria, or fuelling the supply of cheap but mainly formal labour (as in 
the UK). The regularisation of the positions of Eastern European migrants has led to a reshuffling of 
migratory flows by origin and destination. In Portugal, for instance, the share of immigrants from 
Eastern Europe – which had been extremely high because of the relatively low cost of obtaining a 
visa – has diminished in favour of immigrants from Latin America. Eastern European workers are 
now moving in large numbers to the richer labour markets of the Northern European countries. 
Their legal status as migrants also influences their migratory projects: they can now move more 
easily on a short-term basis. This in turn affects the extent of their competition with domestic 
workers. For migrants with a temporary migratory project, regularisation of their employment 
position may have little appeal if they can trade it for higher wages.21 There is evidence that in Italy, 
with its maturing ‘migrant carer model’, the grey market has been prompt to exploit this model’s 
greater social acceptance by ‘only just’ undercutting regular workers22, thus skimming the market 
and threatening once again to squeeze lower-middle income families out of paid care, were it not 
for monetary transfers and social subsidies (Simonazzi 2006). The duration of the migratory project 
may also affect the career progression and development of immigrants, because neither the 
employer nor the workers invest in their training.  
 
The flow of cheap, legal carers is changing the features of care regimes and care labour markets 
across Europe. We may envisage two possible outcomes. The first is an increase in the supply of 
cheap, regular labour, possibly on a temporary basis, in those countries where the formal care 
market predominates, as in the UK, France23, possibly Sweden. As for the UK, according to the 
Annual Population Survey, in 2006 19% of social workers and 16% of care assistants and home 
carers were born outside the UK.24 Many of them had arrived after 2000 and the trend was rising 
rapidly: Polish immigrants represent 62% of foreign born workers who registered with the Home 
Office to work in the UK in “health and medical services” between 2004 and 2006; 64% of Polish-
born workers in the social care sector arrived in the UK in 2005 (Experian 2007). A plentiful supply 
of cheap carers could move the UK down to the bottom-left cell in figure 2.  
 
                                                 
20 Not only can A8 workers migrate and take up employment in most western European countries without restrictions, 
but those who had already migrated illegally experienced a ‘change of status’ similar to an amnesty. 
21 Moreover, as noted by the Polish Labour Ministry, some immigrant workers register as unemployed back home in 
order to remain in the state health insurance system and receive other benefits (reported in the International Herald 
Tribune, July 2007, “Poland faces severe labour shortage as its workers go west”). 
22 Thus the wage on the black market ranges somewhere between the net and gross regular wage. 
23Immigrant carers are increasing in numbers also in France, especially in the metropolitan areas.  
24 This figure is much higher in London than elsewhere (48 and 68% respectively): better job opportunities and a higher 
cost of living discourage native workers from taking up a job in elderly care. 
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The second outcome concerns those countries which rely on monetary transfers or which have large 
informal markets. Here, greater freedom of movement within the enlarged Europe could have the 
effect of fuelling the informal/irregular market for care. In Germany and Austria, reforms aimed at 
dealing with the financial difficulties of their insurance schemes will be decisive in determining in 
which direction the care regimes of these two countries will move: whether westward, with greater 
recourse to immigrant carers but on a formal basis, or eastward to join the Mediterranean countries 
in the bottom right cluster (fig. 2). In Austria, the options seems to be either an amnesty for those 
illegal care workers already in the country or the creation of a mandatory care insurance system 
which (in contrast to the existing care allowance) would fully cover costs and therefore enable care 
recipients to hire qualified and legally employed staff (Hermann 2006). In Germany, concern about 
the long-term sustainability of the LTC insurance system has generated an intense debate on the 
need for reforms. The main proposal is to implement matching transfers (personengebundenes 
Pflegebudget), which provide a specific cash benefit equal in value to that of in-kind transfers, to be 
used for the purchase of appropriate care services (Arntz et al. 2007). By encouraging more people 
to choose cheaper home care, the matching transfer is intended to replace demand for 
institutionalisation, thereby reducing long term costs. It differs, however, from a lump-sum transfer 
in that it may not be used to pay family members or irregular workers. A pilot study to evaluate the 
effects of this scheme is still under way: if the latter is successful, it may encourage a move away 
from family care, while opening up the LTC market to a variety of new, regular, care providers.25 
To which of the two cells Germany will eventually move thus depends on its degree of success in 
regulating its informal care market, especially at the lower levels of qualification. 
As for the Mediterranean countries, their capacity to move north-west will depend very much on 
how the newly-established funds are disbursed and on the conditions regulating the formal and 
informal care markets. The case of Italy provides a good example. As in the other Mediterranean 
                                                 
25 However, the pilot study revealed that, apparently, there was a large fraction of the frail elderly who preferred care 
arrangements that allowed for informal care within the family to be reimbursed. This aspect discouraged about a quarter 
of all interested individuals from participating in the experiment (Arntz, Michaelis, and Spermann 2006). 
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countries with large underground economies, the shortage of care workers in Italy has been filled by 
undocumented/irregular immigrant workers. Their pay is often extremely low compared with that 
earned by a regular worker, though much higher than what they could earn in their home countries. 
A new national contract for domestic workers (in March 2007) fixed the cost to a family of a live-in 
elderly minder on a regular contract at between 1000 and 1300 euros per month (in addition to 
board and lodging costs). This compares with average net earnings in industry and services of 
between 950 – 1250 euros. With these new wages, even if social contributions can be deducted 
from tax, the regular minder solution is no longer sustainable for lower-middle income families, 
which used to rely on the extremely cheap supply of informal carers, and it is no longer competitive 
with residential care, especially if the latter receives a state subsidy. The risk is therefore that this 
form of work will be pushed back into the black market.  The Italian case highlights the drawbacks 
of trying to change working conditions in a sector by decree without considering relative wages and 
family income levels. It is an open question whether the Mediterranean model as we know it will be 
able to survive the creation of a formal ‘regular’ market without the support of a national policy 
able to remedy the problem of dependency. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The care sector has two related problems: ensuring that the labour supply of carers keeps pace with 
increasing demand, and providing quality care in an industry characterized by low wages, poor 
working conditions and high turnover. Countries with more regulated labour markets have been 
more successful in securing an adequate supply of native workers to meet demand. The long-term 
sustainability of care for the elderly is dependent on sound public finances and high labour force 
participation to finance projected care needs. In these countries, the quality of long term care is 
usually considered to be fairly high. Conversely, where labour markets are deregulated, or where 
service buyers have been free to spend their benefits with no restrictions, the market has not been 
able to produce a sustainable solution in terms of the quantity and quality of care labour. It has been 
argued that both the quantity and quality of care are strictly related to the quality of workers and 
jobs. The overriding policy question is thus whether governments are willing to invest the resources 
required to provide high quality care. The most difficult challenges will be improving wages, 
benefits and training opportunities, and enhancing the image of long-term care work, without 
negatively affecting the demand for care (or the access to care services) of lower income families. 
. 
These are the challenges facing the more mature welfare states with fairly developed universal 
elderly care systems, but struggling with increasing costs and budget constraints. Mediterranean 
countries, with care regimes still dependent upon the family, have a much longer way to go. Here 
too, however, there is increasing awareness that the cost of elderly care must be shared more evenly 
within society; that the increasing complexity of the care sector requires coordination and regulation 
by the state; and that long-term, viable solutions must be found to guarantee an adequate supply of 
labour. 
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